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In 1998, Eric Kandelwrote in his intriguing
paper titled “A new intellectual framework
for psychiatry” (Kandel, 1998) that “the
unique domain which psychiatry occupies
within academic medicine, the analysis of
the interaction between social and biolog-
ical determinants of behavior, can best be
studied by also having a full understanding
of the biological components of behavior.”
Fifteen years later, much like surfers who
continue a frustrated and longing pursuit
for the next “big one” (Cowan et al., 2000;
Kandel, 2006), we are, according toHenrik
Walter, in the midst of the third wave
of biological psychiatry (Walter, 2013).
Because a wave is, in a physical sense, a
disturbance that propagates through space
and time while transferring energy, there
are at least three reoccurring “thermo-
dynamic sinks” that I would like to also
emphasize withWalter to ultimately better
understand the complexity of the human
brain in action (Bassett, 2011).
First is the rediscovery of the coequal
contributions of emotions and affects
toward normal brain functioning
(Damasio, 2003; Tsuchiya and Adolphs,
2007). AfterMichael Gazzaniga andGeorge
Miller “invented” “cognitive neuroscience”
in the late 1980s (Zorumski and Rubin,
2011), the predominance of a cognition-
centered view of “higher” (and perhaps
as one facet: more noble?) brain func-
tions was able to again delay necessary and
not so new “insults” to our species and
misdirect (in its top-down-view of brain
functioning) the conceptualization and
treatment of mental disorders (Cromwell
and Panksepp, 2011; Almada et al., 2013).
Neurobiology helps us recalibrate the
human wishful thinking we had come
to appreciate regarding the “higher”
and “lower” of the “conditio humana”
imprinted in our (neuro)physiology. As
the world divides into facts, there is in fact
no such hierarchy imprinted in our brains.
Rather, the brain seems to favor “dynamic
coalitions of networks of brain areas with
a high degree of connectivity,” and these
networks - or the connectome - should
not be conceptualized as being specifically
affective or cognitive (Pessoa, 2008).
Second is the rediscovery of the body in
biological psychiatry. Walter mentions the
“4Es” (embodiment, embeddedness, enac-
tivism, extended cognition) and the chal-
lenge of so-called “situatedness” (Walter,
2013). However, the very first step toward
valuing the operant inter-wovenness of
mind and body might be a simpler one.
Interestingly of ectodermal origin, neural
tissue emerged enabling motor control in
an evolutionary beneficial way. The brain
originates in relation to a body that again,
in relation to the outer world, actively
moves – and, not least, gained the abil-
ity to interact with other bodies. Sensory
information about the “situation,” the re-
flective information involved in reflexes,
is primarily able to close the loop and
help coordinate movement. If Antonio R.
Damasio is right, there is a need for emo-
tions before we can feel anything, and
these emotions are intimately connected
with “more or less the complex reactions
the body has to certain stimuli” (Damsio,
2005). These so-called “somatic markers”
(Damasio, 1996) apparently make us capa-
ble of making predominantly beneficial
decisions for self-preservation and the (we
have to admit: biologically sexual) preser-
vation of our species. It is designative
that the brain is the “unmoved mover.”
However, changes are also reflected in the
brain itself if the “motor-sensory” con-
nections to the body are disturbed, e.g.,
in paraplegia (Wiens, 2005; Lenggenhager
et al., 2012). The fantasy of an ever-
dreaming, monolithic (but nonetheless
self-conscious) “brain in a vat” that could
reasonably think (or meaningfully simu-
late) about “what is it like to be a bat”
(Nagel, 1974) currently suffers from not
only solipsistic but also neurobiological-
Darwinistic (so to say “inborn”) pitfalls. In
this manifold context, it is interesting that
today’s “modern or third wave” of psy-
chiatry is more willing to pay increased
attention to enigmatic somatic symptom
disorders (other than at first glance mere
“brain disorders” such as schizophrenia,
depression, addiction, and dementia) and
attempts to incorporate the body and its
imprinted neural representation into a
genuine, more holistic understanding of
the field. One could interpret it as a new
esteem of anciently quirky psychosomatics
in biological psychiatry that overcomes its
centro-centric monodimensionality.
Third is the rediscovery of the impor-
tance of “being in relation” for reasonable
neural functioning, especially in terms of
social relationships for the human brain.
From birth until death, human mam-
mals need the “significant other(s),” and
it is perhaps the most integrating frame-
work covering cognitive and affective
neurosciences that will give rise to emerg-
ing social neurosciences (Eisenberger and
Cole, 2012; Singer, 2012). Newly emerg-
ing imaging techniques, such as hyperscan-
ning (Babiloni and Astolfi, 2012), i.e., the
simultaneous recording of brain activity
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of different subjects that allows “the study
of inter-brain correlations between the
cerebral activity of a group of interact-
ing subjects as a unique system” (Babiloni
and Astolfi, 2012), will help us under-
stand the brain and perhaps pave the
way to a central second-person neuroscience
(Schilbach et al., 2013). Against this back-
ground, and only as one important exam-
ple, empathy and the question of its quality
and quantity in men have gained more
and more attention in modern neuro-
science (Gonzalez-Liencres et al., 2013).
Psychotherapy and its proven impact
on mental health (Etkin et al., 2005),
before any technical question, fundamen-
tally relies on the quality of the relation
between two human beings (like patient
and therapist) (Ardito and Rabellino,
2011). One could, again, interpret this
rediscovery as the new esteem of anciently
subordinate psychotherapy in biological
psychiatry.
Finally, after three waves, a fourth
wave seems inevitable. I would ven-
ture to predict that this “new wave”
will belong to the computational neu-
rosciences (Wen et al., 2011; Poldrack
et al., 2012) and arise from the back-
ground of information integration theory
(Tononi, 2005). The Human Brain Project
(Markram, 2012) which was awarded
one of the European Union’s Flagship
grants in 2013, worth more than C1 bil-
lion ($1.35 billion) over the next ten
years, aims for the first time to tie or
link up all knowledge of and to simu-
late the complete human brain from the
molecule to the cortex on supercomput-
ers to better understand how it func-
tions (or even malfunctions), is ultimately
the first step into a new era of real
cooperativeness among neuroscientists and
brains (Markram, 2013). Unfortunately,
largely without “third wave” psychiatry.
Just as affect and cognition, body and soul,
the body-bound brain and the brain of
my conspecific, and psychiatry and psy-
chosomatics grow together, entities that
belong together grow together. We have
the opportunity to see the emergence of
a new, non-reductionist science of frac-
tal brains, as we examine mental orders
and disorders differently, in a “brainy
way,” with more cooperation and integra-
tion than ever before. In one word, in
accordance with Henry Markram (Kandel
et al., 2013): exciting!
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